Feelings and judgments of knowing: Is there a special noetic state?

Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):178-186 (2000)
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Abstract

A. Koriat distinguishes between feeling-based and inferentially based feeling-of-knowing judgments. The former are attributable to partial information that is activated in implicit memory but not fully articulated. They are not, however, attributable to direct access to the target-an hypothesis that Koriat specifically repudiates. While there is considerable merit in the distinction that Koriat draws, and his emphasis on the possibility that people base at least some of their metacognitive judgments on implicit information seems well founded, it is argued that his rejection of the direct access view is premature. There may be a state-a true noetic state-in which people actually know the answer before they are able to express it. A case is made for further consideration of the scientific merits of the direct-access view of the noetic feelings people experience in imminent tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states

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References found in this work

Personal knowledge.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - Chicago,: University of Chicago Press.
Personal Knowledge.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - Chicago,: Routledge.
Personal Knowledge.Manley Thompson - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (1):111.

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