Memory, imaginary and Aristotelian epistemology. On the nature of “apterous fly”

Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 9 (27):132-156 (2010)
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References found in this work

Aristotle on the Imagination.Malcolm Schofield - 1995 [1992] - In Martha Craven Nussbaum & Amélie Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 249--77.
The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle.Dorothea Frede - 1995 [1992] - In Martha Craven Nussbaum & Amélie Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 279-95.
Les multiples chemins aristotéliciens de la sensation commune.Jacques Brunschwig - 1991 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 96 (4):455 - 474.
Ioan Petru Culianu, sau filosoful (religiilor) ca “magician”.Aurel Codoban - 2001 - Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 1 (1):91-105.

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