Can Machine Learning Provide Understanding? How Cosmologists Use Machine Learning to Understand Observations of the Universe

Erkenntnis 88 (5):1895-1909 (2023)
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Abstract

The increasing precision of observations of the large-scale structure of the universe has created a problem for simulators: running the simulations necessary to interpret these observations has become impractical. Simulators have thus turned to machine learning (ML) algorithms instead. Though ML decreases computational expense, one might be worried about the use of ML for scientific investigations: How can algorithms that have repeatedly been described as black-boxes deliver scientific understanding? In this paper, I investigate how cosmologists employ ML, arguing that in this context, ML algorithms should not be considered black-boxes and can deliver genuine scientific understanding. Accordingly, understanding the methodological role of ML algorithms is crucial to understanding the types of questions they are capable of, and ought to be responsible for, answering.

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Helen Meskhidze
University of California, Irvine

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References found in this work

Understanding from Machine Learning Models.Emily Sullivan - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):109-133.
Transparency in Complex Computational Systems.Kathleen A. Creel - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):568-589.
Three Kinds of Idealization.Michael Weisberg - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (12):639-659.
Minimal Model Explanations.Robert W. Batterman & Collin C. Rice - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):349-376.
Explanatory instability.Robert W. Batterman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (3):325-348.

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