The situation of transcendental arguments

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (4):731 - 749 (2004)
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Abstract

Transcendental arguments are widely understood as anti-skeptical arguments. These arguments point out the conceptual structure of every possible knowledge and experience that cannot be refuted by the skeptical challenge. In this sense, transcendental arguments are supra-temporal. This is so because the necessary conditions of possible knowledge and experience do not change, but rather, are independent from relation to any specific situation of arguing. In contrast to this position, firstly this article attempts todemonstrate that transcendental arguments cannot reach their emphatic goal of sketchinga conceptual scheme that is resistant to any form of skepticism. Secondly, the paper endeavors to point out that the proper sense of transcendental arguments is to understandonly if one considers also the reference of transcendental arguments to the concrete situation of arguing transcendentally

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