On whether being conscious is intrinsic

Mind 107 (428):845-846 (1998)
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10.1093/mind/107.428.845

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Citations of this work

Living without microphysical supervenience.Alex Moran - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):405-428.
The Many-Subjects Argument against Physicalism.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - In Geoffrey Lee & Adam Pautz (eds.), The Importance of Being Conscious. Oxford University Press.
The hard problem of the many.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):449-468.
Is My Head a Person?Michael B. Burke - 2003 - In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 107-125.
Identity, constitution and microphysical supervenience.Harold W. Noonan - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3):273-288.

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