Endurance, psychological continuity, and the importance of personal identity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997 (1999)
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Abstract

This paper argues that if persons last over time by “enduring”, then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in tenus of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in tenus of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyses of personal identity---as we must if persons endure---Parfit’s argument for the claim that identity does not matter in survival is easily undenuined. The paper then suggests that this offers support for the claim that persons endure. Along the way the paper tries to clarify the contrast between the doctrine that persons endure and its rival, four-dimensionalism

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Human Animal. Personal identity without psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 192 (1):112-113.
Endurance and indiscernibility.Trenton Merricks - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):165-184.

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