Reply to Philip Woodward’s Review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1261-1267 (2019)
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Abstract

Philip Woodward's review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality (PBI) raises objections to the specific version of the phenomenal intentionality theory proposed in PBI, especially to identity PIT, representationalism, the picture of derived mental representation, some tentative proposals regarding intentional structure, and the matching theory of truth and reference. In this reply, I argue that the version of PIT defended in PBI can withstand these objections.

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Author's Profile

Angela Mendelovici
University of Western Ontario

References found in this work

Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Consciousness in Action.Jennifer Church & S. L. Hurley - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):465.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence Bonjour - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):657-663.

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