Normative realism, or Bernard Williams and ethics at the limit

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3):306 – 318 (1989)
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Recent arguments for normative realism have centered on attempts to meet a demand on normative facts articulated by harman, That they be required for explanations of uncontroversial phenomena. This paper argues that another argument for normative realism should take precedence, An argument suggested by williams's skeptical discussion of moral objectivity in "ethics and the limits of philosophy"



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Joseph Mendola
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

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