Intuitive Maximin

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):429 - 439 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One standard objection to familiar utilitarian consequentialism queries its troubling commitment to the maximization of overall value irrespective of distribution, for instance among the well and badly off. Call this ‘the objection from distribution.’

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,060

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Goodness and Justice: A Consequentialist Moral Theory.Joseph Mendola - 2006 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Must I Benefit Myself?Michael Cholbi - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oup Usa. pp. 253-268.
Goodness and Justice. [REVIEW]Ben Bradley - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):233-243.
Priority and Time.Dennis McKerlie - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):287 - 309.
Distributive Justice and Welfarism in Utilitarianism.Jörg Schroth - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):123-146.
On the value of distributional equality.Joseph Raz - 2009 - In Stephen De Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges. New York: Routledge.
Sufficiency and the Distribution of Burdens.Robert Huseby - forthcoming - Ethics, Policy and Environment.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
51 (#335,307)

6 months
11 (#532,845)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joseph Mendola
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

Equality-tempered prioritarianism.Dale Dorsey - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):45-61.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Consequentialism, group acts, and trolleys.Joseph Mendola - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):64–87.

Add more references