Transcendental tense: D.h. Mellor

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):29–44 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the tensed nature of time. Nor are McTaggart' s difficulties due to the tensed nature of time. The ego-centricity of tensed discourse is an essential feature of communication between selves, each of whom refers himself as 'I', and is required for talking about time as well as experience and agency. Arguments based on the Special Theory are misconceived. Some rest on a confused notion of 'topological simultaneity'. In the General Theory a cosmic time is defined, as also in quantum mechanics, where a natural present is defined by a unique hyperplane of collapse into eigen-ness

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Modality and Mellor's Mctaggart.M. J. Cresswell - 1990 - Studia Logica 49 (2):163 - 170.
Transcendental Tense.D. H. Mellor - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):29 - 56.
The pervasive paradox of tense.Heather Dyke - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):103-124.
A-theory for b-theorists.Josh Parsons - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):1-20.
Becoming inflated.Craig Bourne - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):107-119.
Wishing it were now some other time.William Lane Craig - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):159-166.
Real time II.David Hugh Mellor - 1998 - New York: Routledge.
Heidegger's critique of the vulgar notion of time.Pierre Keller - 1996 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1):43 – 66.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
86 (#190,239)

6 months
18 (#127,601)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hugh Mellor
Last affiliation: Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Fragmentalism We can Believe in.Giovanni Merlo - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):184-205.
Tensed Belief.Vasilis Tsompanidis - 2011 - Dissertation, University of California Santa Barbara

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references