The prospects for Kirk's non-reductive physicalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32 (1998)
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Abstract

Using the notion of strict implication, Robert Kirk claims to have formulated a version of physicalism which is nonreductive. I argue that, depending on how his notion of strict implication is interpreted, Kirk's formulation either fails to be physicalist or else commits him to reductionism. Either way we do not have nonreductive physicalism. I also suggest that the reductionism to which Kirk is committed, though unfashionable, is unobjectionable

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Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia

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