In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 155-172 (2003)

Authors
Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia
Abstract
This paper presents an irreducibly inductive argument for physicalism based on the causal closure of the physical (for which it argues), and defends it against various detractors.
Keywords Physicalism  Causal closure  Materialism  Mental Causation  Dualism  Causal Overdetermination  Causal Argument
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A Defence of the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism.Jared Bates - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324.
No Good Arguments for Causal Closure.Keith Buhler - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (2):223-236.

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