Abstract
Self-deception and akratic action (roughly, uncompelled intentional action that is contrary to the agent's better judgment) are the leading dramatis personae in philosophical work on motivated irrational behavior. David Pears's Motivated Irrationality advances our understanding of both phenomena and of their causal and conceptual interrelationships. Irrationality, as Pears understands it, is "incorrect processing of information in the mind" (p. 14). In instances of motivated irrationality, the faulty processing is due to the influence of desires or wishes, broadly construed. There is no "clear-cut distinction," Pears maintains, between "hot" and "cold" (i.e., motivated and unmotivated) cases, "but there are some indubitable cases of each
type at each end of the spectrum" (p. 14). At the hot end are central species of self-deception and akratic action. Pears's primary concern is with motivated irrationality of these two sorts. He also comments at some length on other species of motivated irrationality, on cold irrational belief, and on practical reasoning (Chapter 7) and practical truth (Chapter 8).