Motivation and Intention

Journal of Philosophical Research 21:51-67 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This essay defends the compatibility of a pair of popular theses in the philosophy of action and rebuts arguments of Hugh McCann’s (1995) designed to show that my earlier efforts, in Springs of Action, to resolve the apparent tension were unsuccessful. One thesis links what agents intentionally do at a time, t, to what they are most strongly motivated to do at t. The other is a thesis about the nature and functions of intent.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

41 (#400,450)

6 months
3 (#1,046,015)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alfred Mele
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Explaining Synchronic Self-Control.Jing Zhu - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):475-492.
Intention and Volition.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):175 - 193.
Intention and Volition.Z. H. U. Jing - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):175-194.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references