Can physicalism be non-reductive?

Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296 (2008)
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Abstract

Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.

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Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

Defining physicalism.Alyssa Ney - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1033-1048.
Grounding, physicalism and necessity.Donnchadh O'Conaill - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):713-730.
Physicalism, not scientism.Alyssa Ney - 2018 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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