A Case For Physicalism About The Human Mind

God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence (2007)
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Abstract

The first of three contributions to an e-book in which I debated Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro on the question whether the human mind is material. I said that it is, and they said that it isn't. The article is meant to be intelligible to an educated general audience. In this first contribution, I present a simplified version of the argument for physicalism based on the neural dependence of mental phenomena.

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Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia

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