Why Accept Collective Beliefs?

ProtoSociology 18:377-388 (2003)
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Abstract

Margaret Gilbert has recently argued in ProtoSociology against what she called my rejectionist’s view according to which (i) we have to make a distinction between the intentional states of believing and accepting and (ii) genuine group beliefs, i.e. group beliefs that cannot be reduced to the beliefs of the individual members of a group, should be understood in terms of the acceptance of a view rather than of beliefs proper. In this reply I discuss Gilbert’s objections.

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Anthonie Meijers
Eindhoven University of Technology

Citations of this work

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Group understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6837-6858.
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