Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):34-50 (2000)
AbstractTraditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal beings, although they hardly feel their bodies. They can initiate movements, and with the help of visual feedback learn to control them. It is shown that the traditional view of the self as immaterial is not supported by these cases. But the argument against this view has to be amended. It relies too much on bodily sensations, and misses the importance of active self-movement.
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Citations of this work
Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location.Frederic Peters - 2010 - Psychological Research.
The Self as an Embedded Agent.Chris Dobbyn & Susan A. J. Stuart - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):187-201.
A Neurocognitive and Socioecological Model of Self-Awareness.Alain Morin - 2004 - Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs 130 (3):197-222.
Conscious Machines: Memory, Melody and Muscular Imagination. [REVIEW]Susan A. J. Stuart - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):37-51.
Real People and Virtual Bodies: How Disembodied Can Embodiment Be? [REVIEW]Monica Meijsing - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):443-461.
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