Abstract

In the last thirty years there has been a great deal of interest in Plato's late dialogues. However, so far a consensus on the interpretation of these works has failed to emerge. The principal reason for this is that understanding the Parmenides--which introduces the late group--is a necessary precondition for understanding the other late dialogues, and the Parmenides has until now not been at all well understood. ;The first part of the Parmenides notoriously presents a series of problems that face someone holding views reminiscent of the middle dialogues. Plato offers the second part of the dialogue as an exercise needed if one is to go on to get things right in metaphysics. But the exercise consists of arguments whose conclusions are in systematic contradiction with each other. In this dissertation, I aim to show that Plato meant us to develop a certain distinction between two kinds of predication in the light of which the contradictions will be seen to exist only at the grammatical level. The two kinds of predication will emerge as the foundation for a metaphysics which will have outgrown the problems of the first part of the dialogue