Conditioning and intervening

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):1001-1021 (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX


We consider the dispute between causal decision theorists and evidential decision theorists over Newcomb-like problems. We introduce a framework relating causation and directed graphs developed by Spirtes et al. (1993) and evaluate several arguments in this context. We argue that much of the debate between the two camps is misplaced; the disputes turn on the distinction between conditioning on an event E as against conditioning on an event I which is an action to bring about E. We give the essential machinery for calculating the effect of an intervention and consider recent work which extends the basic account given here to the case where causal Knowledge is incomplete.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,181

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

270 (#42,970)

6 months
2 (#275,633)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Clark Glymour
Carnegie Mellon University

Citations of this work

Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.
Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition.Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):521-583.
Causation and Manipulability.James Woodward - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 49 citations / Add more citations