Three proposals regarding a theory of chance

Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):281–307 (2005)
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Abstract

I argue that the theory of chance proposed by David Lewis has three problems: (i) it is time asymmetric in a manner incompatible with some of the chance theories of physics, (ii) it is incompatible with statistical mechanical chances, and (iii) the content of Lewis's Principal Principle depends on how admissibility is cashed out, but there is no agreement as to what admissible evidence should be. I proposes two modifications of Lewis's theory which resolve these difficulties. I conclude by tentatively proposing a third modification of Lewis's theory, one which explains many of the common features shared by the chance theories of physics.

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Christopher J. G. Meacham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.
Two mistakes regarding the principal principle.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431.
Chance and Context.Toby Handfield & Alastair Wilson - 2014 - In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Time and Chance.David Z. Albert - 2000 - Harvard University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.

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