Impermissive Bayesianism

Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper examines the debate between permissive and impermissive forms of Bayesianism. It briefly discusses some considerations that might be offered by both sides of the debate, and then replies to some new arguments in favor of impermissivism offered by Roger White. First, it argues that White’s (Oxford studies in epistemology, vol 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–186, 2010) defense of Indifference Principles is unsuccessful. Second, it contends that White’s (Philos Perspect 19:445–459, 2005) arguments against permissive views do not succeed.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-05-13

Downloads
1,583 (#9,876)

6 months
228 (#12,259)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher J. G. Meacham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

References found in this work

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.

View all 25 references / Add more references