Philosophical Studies 149 (1):49-71 (2010)

Christopher J. G. Meacham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising implications for a number of other debates in decision theory. I then assess the plausibility of this claim, and suggest that it should be rejected.
Keywords Decision theory  Binding  Causal  Evidential  Decision instability
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9539-7
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
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