Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single, Objective World

European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):195-220 (2015)
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Abstract

Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests, and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands, I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like

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Denis McManus
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

Being‐Towards‐Death and Owning One's Judgment.Denis McManus - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):245-272.
Being-Towards-Death and Owning One's Judgment.Denis McManus - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):245-272.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - New York and London: Harper Torchbooks.
Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.

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