The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert

The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):241-255 (2019)
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Abstract

A familiar claim in the free will debate is that the freedom in dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists is limited to the type required for an agent to deserve blame for moral wrongdoing, and to deserve it in a sense that is basic. In this paper, I seek a rationale for this claim, offer an explanation of basic desert, and then argue that the free will debate can persist even when divorced from basic desert.

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10.1007/s10892-019-09292-4

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Michael McKenna
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

The Tension in Critical Compatibilism.Robert H. Wallace - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):321-332.
What Makes the Free Will Debate Substantive?Derk Pereboom - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):257-264.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.

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