Dispositional Pluralism

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract

Jennifer McKitrick offers an opinionated guide to the philosophy of dispositions. In her view, when an object has a disposition, it is such that, if a certain type of circumstance were to occur, a certain kind of event would occur. Since this is very common for this to be the case, dispositions are an abundant and diverse feature of our world.

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Author's Profile

Jennifer McKitrick
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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References found in this work

David Lewis.Daniel Nolan - 2005 - Chesham: Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals.David Manley - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321 - 334.
Noncausal Dispositions.Daniel Nolan - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):425-439.

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