Agency and the Successive Structure of Time-Consciousness

Erkenntnis 88 (5):2013-2034 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they (1) fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the outcomes of their actions, (2) exhibit the wrong sort of epistemic status for agency, and (3) lack the requisite agentive mental attitude of intentionality. I conclude that agency is incompatible with non-successive experience and therefore we should view the successive temporal structure of experience as a necessary condition for agency. I also suggest that the Succession Requirement may actually extend beyond my main focus on agency, offering preliminary considerations in favor of seeing successive experience as a precondition for selfhood as well. The consequences of the Succession Requirement are wide-ranging, and I discuss various implications for our understanding of agency, the self, time consciousness, and theology, among other things.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Representation of Time in Agency.Holly Andersen - 2013 - In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
Introduction.Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-18.
The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
Introduction: Special Issue on Time and Consciousness.Sean Enda Power - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3-4):7-13.
Intentional binding and higher order agency experience.James W. Moore & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):490-491.
Brain Time and Phenomenological Time.Rick Grush - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 160.
The Consciousness of Succession.Michael R. Kelly - 2009 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):127-139.
The Consciousness of Succession.Michael R. Kelly - 2009 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):127-139.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-07-26

Downloads
82 (#191,529)

6 months
17 (#115,500)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Camden McKenna
University of Edinburgh

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Getting Causes From Powers.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Rani Lill Anjum.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.

View all 35 references / Add more references