Erkenntnis:1-22 (forthcoming)

Camden McKenna
University of Edinburgh
I argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the outcomes of their actions, exhibit the wrong sort of epistemic status for agency, and lack the requisite agentive mental attitude of intentionality. I conclude that agency is incompatible with non-successive experience and therefore we should view the successive temporal structure of experience as a necessary condition for agency. I also suggest that the Succession Requirement may actually extend beyond my main focus on agency, offering preliminary considerations in favor of seeing successive experience as a precondition for selfhood as well. The consequences of the Succession Requirement are wide-ranging, and I discuss various implications for our understanding of agency, the self, time consciousness, and theology, among other things.
Keywords Philosophy of Time  Time-Consciousness  Agency  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Action  Time Perception  Philosophy of Religion  Phenomenology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-021-00440-7
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,066
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Representation of Time in Agency.Holly Andersen - 2013 - In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
Introduction.Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-18.
The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
Introduction: Special Issue on Time and Consciousness.Sean Enda Power - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3-4):7-13.
Intentional Binding and Higher Order Agency Experience.James W. Moore & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):490-491.
Brain Time and Phenomenological Time.Rick Grush - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 160.


Added to PP index

Total views
40 ( #281,363 of 2,498,781 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #40,995 of 2,498,781 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes