Wittgenstein and the vienna circle

Synthese 64 (3):351 - 358 (1985)
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Abstract

This essay examines the role allocated to ostensive definition in the logical empiricist philosophy of the vienna circle. it explains how this characteristic array of doctrines grew out of reflections on the "tractatus". the various theses are distinguished into general principles, logical aspects, normative aspects and psychological theses. a detailed survey of wittgenstein's later analysis of ostensive definition is undertaken. this is then brought to bear on the doctrines of logical empiricism to show that they are incoherent. the essay concludes by sketching out how much of those fallacious doctrines survive explicitly in contemporary philosophy of language

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Moral modesty, moral judgment and moral advice. A Wittgensteinian approach.Benjamin De Mesel - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75 (1):20-37.

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