Realism, Reference and Grue (Why Metaphysical Realism Cannot Solve the Grue Paradox)

American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):47 - 57 (2003)
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Abstract

This paper argue that metaphysical realism is insufficient to solve Goodman's grue paradox

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Mary Kate McGowan
Wellesley College

Citations of this work

The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):575-594.

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