“On Indirect Speech Acts and Linguistic Communication: A Response to Bertolet”1: McGowan, Tam and Hall

Philosophy 84 (4):495-513 (2009)
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Abstract

Suppose a diner says, 'Can you pass the salt?' Although her utterance is literally a question (about the physical abilities of the addressee), most would take it as a request (that the addressee pass the salt). In such a case, the request is performed indirectly by way of directly asking a question. Accordingly this utterance is known as an indirect speech act. On the standard account of such speech acts, a single utterance constitutes two distinct speech acts. On this account then, 'Can you pass the salt?' is both a question and a request. In a provocative essay, Rod Bertolet argues that there are no indirect speech acts. According to Bertolet, 'Can you pass the salt?' is only a question. It is a question that merely functions as a request (without also being one). In this paper we respond to Bertolet's skeptical argument. Appealing to Searle's theory of speech acts and to certain features of linguistic communication, we argue that, despite Bertolet's challenge, there is good reason to countenance indirect speech acts

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Mary Kate McGowan
Wellesley College

Citations of this work

On the Arguments for Indirect Speech Acts.Rod Bertolet - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):533-540.
What is an indirect speech act?Jörg Meibauer - 2019 - Pragmatics and Cognition 26 (1):61-84.

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References found in this work

Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.

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