Moral Realism without Convergence

Philosophical Topics 38 (2):59-90 (2010)
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Abstract

It is sometimes claimed that if moral realism is true, then rational and informed individuals would not disagree about morality. According to this line of thought, the moral realist is committed to an extremely substantive convergence thesis, one that might very well turn out to be false. Although this idea has been accepted by prominent moral realists as well as by antirealists, I argue that we have no reason to think that it is true, and that the only convergence claims to which the realist is committed are trivial ones.

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Sarah McGrath
Princeton University

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