Moral Knowledge

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2019)
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Abstract

How fragile is our knowledge of morality, compared to other kinds of knowledge? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds? Sarah McGrath offers new answers to these questions as she explores the possibilities, sources and characteristic vulnerabilities of moral knowledge.

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BJ37.M34 2019

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9780198805410   0198805411   9780191843488
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Sarah McGrath
Princeton University

Citations of this work

A limited defense of moral perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
There Are No Irrational Emotions.Steven Gubka - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):293-317.
Normative Models and Their Success.Lukas Beck & Marcel Jahn - 2021 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (2):123-150.
Metaethics.Geoff Sayre-McCord - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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