Oxford University Press (2019)

Authors
Sarah McGrath
Princeton University
Abstract
How fragile is our knowledge of morality, compared to other kinds of knowledge? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds? Sarah McGrath offers new answers to these questions as she explores the possibilities, sources and characteristic vulnerabilities of moral knowledge.
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ISBN(s) 9780198805410   0198805411
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A Limited Defense of Moral Perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
The Phenomenology of Moral Intuition.Robert Audi - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):53-69.
Moral Experience: Its Existence, Describability, and Significance.Uriah Kriegel - 2020 - In C. Erhard and T. Keiling (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 396-411.

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