I—Non‐Inferential Knowledge

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):1-28 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper looks at statements I am in a position to make ‘straight off’: observational judgements, perceptual and memory statements, statements about my posture, my intentions, and so on. These kinds of statement pose a problem: what is the nature of my entitlement to them? I focus on observational judgements and on two contrasting approaches to them. The first, which I reject, provides an account of my warrant for them; the second, which I defend, disconnects my entitlement from possession of a justification. I consider what light the second approach sheds on the other kinds of statements I am in a position to make straight off.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Priority in Roderick Firth's Theory of Knowledge.Elizabeth C. Myers - 1990 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany
Cualidades secundarias y autoconocimiento.Julia Vergara - 1997 - Análisis Filosófico 17 (1):5-26.
Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.
What is entitlement?Albert Casullo - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):267 - 279.
Knowledge for Nothing.Patrick Michael Greenough - 2018 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Essays on Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
Inference and Scepticism.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2014 - In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
A Paradox of Inferentialism.Giacomo Turbanti - 2015 - AL-Mukhatabat 16:163-195.
The Limits of Aesthetic Empiricism.Fabian Dorsch - 2014 - In Gregory Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin & Jon Robson (eds.), Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-100.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-07-14

Downloads
129 (#138,075)

6 months
11 (#222,787)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marie McGinn
University of York

Citations of this work

Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.
Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Awareness.Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):596-603.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
(Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
Tyler Burge on disjunctivism.John McDowell - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.

View all 7 references / Add more references