Philosophical Studies 160 (3):391-405 (2012)

Authors
Aidan McGlynn
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Timothy Williamson has proposed that we should give a ‘knowledge first’ twist to David Lewis’s account of content, maintaining that for P to be the content of one’s belief is for P to be the content that would be attributed by an idealized interpreter working under certain constraints, and that the fundamental constraint on interpretation is a principle of knowledge maximization. According to this principle, an interpretation is correct to the extent that it maximizes the number of knowledgeable judgments the subject comes out as making. Here I will argue against knowledge maximization and two fallback positions suggested by Williamson’s discussion. Williamson intends the principle of knowledge maximization to form the basis of an argument against a certain sort of skepticism about judgment. In the final section I argue that the kind of general response to judgment skepticism envisaged by Williamson is neither desirable nor necessary
Keywords Interpretation  Reference  Content  Knowledge  Skepticism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9725-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,489
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature?Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Evidence= Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism?Stephen Schiffer - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--202.
Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic.Dylan Dodd - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.
Know How to Be Gettiered?Ted Poston - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747.
The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Frank Hindriks - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
Luminous Margins.Brian Weatherson - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):373 – 383.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-04-14

Total views
162 ( #73,476 of 2,520,788 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #137,490 of 2,520,788 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes