Epistemic Objectification as the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice

Episteme 18 (2):160-176 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper criticises Miranda Fricker's account of the primary harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification, where the latter is understood on the model provided by Martha Nussbaum's influential analysis of sexual objectification and where it is taken to involve the denial of someone's epistemic agency. I examine the existing objections to Fricker's account of the primary harm, criticising some while accepting the force of others, and I argue that one of Fricker's own central examples of testimonial injustice in fact offers the basis of a particularly telling objection. While Fricker's other critics have mostly concluded that we need to look at alternative theoretical resources to offer an account of the primary harm of testimonial injustice, I aim to show that this is premature; both Fricker and her critics have underestimated the resources provided by Nussbaum's analysis of objectification when offering an account of the primary harm, and something very much in the spirit of Fricker's account survives the objections.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Testimonial Injustice in International Criminal Law.Shannon Fyfe - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):155-171.
Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit.Federico Luzzi - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):203-211.
Epistemic harm and virtues of self-evaluation.Sarah Wright - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1691-1709.
Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust.Gloria Origgi - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-04-06

Downloads
249 (#74,314)

6 months
44 (#80,049)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Aidan McGlynn
University of Edinburgh