better no longer to be

South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):55-68 (2012)
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Abstract

David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life, one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism and pro-mortalism . This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman – she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are ‘awful’, it follows that ‘we would be better off to kill ourselves’ (Harman 2009: 784). Though we agree with Harman’s conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatar’s arguments for non-pro-mortalism deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatar’s position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatar’s position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatar’s treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatar’s pro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatar’s anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be.

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Author Profiles

Ema Sullivan-Bissett
University of Birmingham
Rafe McGregor
Edge Hill University

Citations of this work

The Hypothetical Consent Objection to Anti-Natalism.Asheel Singh - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1135-1150.
Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties.Gerald Harrison - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):94-103.
Why would very bad lives be worth continuing?Matej Sušnik - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):285-295.
Joy and the Myopia of Finitude.Brian Treanor - 2016 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 8 (1):6-25.

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References found in this work

與非洲相比在中國的價值.Thaddeus Metz - 2018 - In Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.), 汉学与当代中国座谈会文集(2017). China Social Sciences Press. pp. 612-619.
Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Died.David B. Suits - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):69 - 84.
Are Lives Worth Creating?Thaddeus Metz - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):233-255.

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