Philosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science

Springer Verlag (2019)
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Abstract

Recent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy’s possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the “dazzling ideal” of science. This ‘dazzling ideal’ incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation—whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained—and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such a scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy, McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation.

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Chapters

Conclusion: The Place of Reason

That 'dazzling image' of science, applied to human beings, can seem to 'undermine' science by leaving no place for Reason. The conclusion here extends previous contentions by comparison with ideas from writings of Wilfred Sellars. Additionally, our position is located within general conceptions of r... see more

Philosophy Without Exceptionlessness

Should the apparent exceptionlessness of science reappear in philosophy—does philosophy too require exceptionless conclusions? The 'dazzling image' from science, when applied to human beings, might suggest an affirmative answer. But a worked example illustrates how even extant philosophical investig... see more

Considerations of Exceptionlessness in Philosophy: Or, “Everything …”

It can seem that the apparent exceptionlessness of science, part of its 'dazzling image' applied to human beings, should reappear in philosophy—surely philosophy too requires exceptionless conclusions . But, given our general rejection of the demand for exceptionlessness, philosophy cannot import th... see more

Persons, Artificial Intelligence, and Science Fiction Thought–Experiments

Perhaps our minds are just like computers, even if of interesting kinds . Then that 'dazzling image' might make particular thoughts seem inevitable, generated exceptionlessly. Hence, Chap. 10.1007/978-3-030-21675-7_6 addresses issues most readily raised for artificial intelligence to further elabora... see more

Evolutionary Explanation in Psychology: Not an Issue for Philosophy?

Are our psychologies too determined by our evolutionary biology? Applying the 'dazzling image' to human beings might make it seem so, with our nature as persons fixed by those biological perspectives that recognize us as the animals we obviously are, given the causal explanation appropriate to biolo... see more

What Persons Are Not: Causality, Minds, and the Brain

Discussions of causality regularly presuppose, for genuinely causal relations, the inevitability of outcomes. Then, application of that 'dazzling image' to human thoughts and feelings can seem to imply that our minds are nothing but our brains. Hence, Chap. 10.1007/978-3-030-21675-7_4 is an extended... see more

What Persons Are: Identity, Personal Identity, and Composition

Since asking which person is involved in some action invites elaboration of the contours of a conception of persons as responsible agents, and hence of some details of our mastery of this conception, that elaboration will require us to address the nature of persons in the light of the completeness a... see more

Persons as Agents: The Possibility of Genuine Action

On our account of persons, especially of their importance for the possibility of philosophy, persons must be agents, able to initiate activity in the sublunary world. For only that could justify their responsibility .Any discussion of human agency must respect the explanatory power of science: laws ... see more

Introductory: A Still Point in a Turning World?

Defending the possibility of philosophy requires elaboration of sets of contrasts with both the achievements and the prospects of natural science. For what Wittgenstein calls the ‘dazzling image’ from science incorporates both the completeness of scientific explanation and the inexorability, or exce... see more

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