Reimagining Illocutionary Force

The Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Speech act theorists tend to hold that the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by one interlocutor alone: either the speaker or the hearer. Yet experience tells us that the force of our utterances is not determined unilaterally. Rather, communication often feels collaborative. In this paper, I develop and defend a collaborative theory of illocutionary force, according to which the illocutionary force of an utterance is determined by an agreement reached by the speaker and the hearer. This theory, which builds upon linguistic and sociological work on adjacency pairs and conversational interaction, can accommodate the complexity of speaker intentions (which may be disjunctive, indeterminate, and/or inconsistent over time), and renders speech act theory more compatible with theories of common ground.

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Lucy McDonald
King's College London

Citations of this work

Illocution by example.Leo Townsend & Jeremy Wanderer - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-22.

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References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Logic and Conversation.H. P. Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (eds.), The Logic of Grammar. Encino, CA: pp. 64-75.
Using Language.Herbert H. Clark - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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