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Meaning, bivalence, and verificationism
In Gareth Evans & John Henry McDowell (eds.), Truth and meaning: essays in semantics. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 42--66 (1976)
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Citations of this work
Knowledge from scientific expert testimony without epistemic trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3611-3641.
Knowledge from Scientific Expert Testimony without Epistemic Trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - 2018 - Synthese:1-31.
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