Closeness of worlds

Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):227-230 (2003)
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Abstract

An objection is presented to Lewis’s analysis of counterfactual conditionals in terms of relative closeness of possible worlds. The objection depends on no special assumptions about the ‘closer-than’ relation. The argument also casts doubt on Lewis’s claim that Antecedent Strengthening fails for counterfactuals

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Citations of this work

Over-Determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities.Björn Petersson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):841-850.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.

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