Social Epistemology 29 (4):413-430 (2015)

Authors
Benjamin McCraw
University Of South Carolina Upstate
Abstract
This paper offers an analysis of the nature of epistemic trust. With increased philosophical attention to social epistemology in general and testimony in particular, the role for an epistemic or intellectual version of trust has loomed large in recent debates. But, too often, epistemologists talk about trust without really providing a sustained examination of the concept. After some introductory comments, I begin by addressing various components key to trust simpliciter. In particular, I examine what we might think of when we consider what it means to place trust in someone. Once we have examined trust in general, we can modify this discussion to derive an epistemic version of trust—placing trust in someone for an epistemic reason. I argue that ET includes four components: belief, communication, reliance, and confidence. The first two sets are distinctively epistemic and the second set of conditions form the core of any kind of trust. Put together,..
Keywords Trust  Reliance  Confidence  Testimony
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DOI 10.1080/02691728.2014.971907
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
The Role of Trust in Knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics.Annette Baier - 1944 - Harvard University Press.
The Reasons of Trust.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.

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Citations of this work BETA

There is a Distinctively Epistemic Kind of Blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.
What Is Epistemic Public Trust in Science?Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1145-1166.
The Significance of Epistemic Blame.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
Standing to Epistemically Blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11355-11375.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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