The Best Laid Schemes of Mice and Me

Abstract

Adam Elga has argued that holders of imprecise credences fall prey to missed arbitrages, so that rational credences should be sharp. A decision rule proposed by Rohan Sud, Forward Looking, enables imprecise Bayesians to sidestep missed arbitrages and other ``bad books'' in isolated fixed-evidence binary betting sequences such as those of Elga. We show that Forward Looking imprecise Bayesians are committed to a bad book of bets when faced with a particular 3-bet variable-evidence binary betting sequence.

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Randall G. McCutcheon
University of Memphis

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References found in this work

Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.
Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.
A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences.Rohan Sud - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.

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