Dretske on the metaphysics of freedom

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):619-630 (1993)

Abstract

Contrary to Dretske's view, treating actions as causal complexes wherein inner states produce external results does not permit us to claim that even if their components are caused, the actions are not. What triggers the initial element of a causal sequence causes the sequence itself, so whatever might cause the relevant inner state would also cause the action. Dretske's claim that the failure of my agency to extend to the results of actions I induce in others is owing to the "sensitivity" of those results' causal antecedents is also mistaken. Such sensitivity attends the results of my own actions without undoing my agency

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Author's Profile

Hugh J. McCann
Texas A&M University

References found in this work

Intrinsic Intentionality.Hugh J. McCann - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (3):247-273.
The Metaphysics of Freedom.Fred Dretske - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):1-13.

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Citations of this work

Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams.Alfred R. Mele - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):627 - 636.

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