Philosophical Studies 27 (3):201 - 209 (1975)

In order to characterize actions, It is not necessary to describe the characteristic way in which they are caused by an agent's wants and beliefs, As a I goldman and d davidson have supposed. It is enough to note the absence of alternative causes. Nor are all our actions intentional, As both davidson and, In a more limiting way, A c danto, Have suggested. These are the theses argued in this paper
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DOI 10.1007/BF01624157
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