Can religious beliefs be justified pragmatically?

Sophia 46 (1):21-34 (2007)
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Abstract

One cannot prove the truth of theological statement, but perhaps one can justify believing them because of the good consequences of doing so. It is irrational to believe statements of which there are good reasons to think false, but those of which there is some, albeit inconclusive, evidence can be believed for pragmatic reasons. However, in the interest of simplicity, it must not be possible to achieve those good consequences without such faith. John Bishop and others have argued that one need only assume theological statements to be true to enjoy the good consequences of a religious life, but in fact, faith is needed for most of these consequences to be achieved.

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Citations of this work

Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 15-54.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Religious Experience.William James - 1903 - Philosophical Review 12 (1):62-67.
Faith and reason.Richard Swinburne - 1981 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Faith and Reason.Richard Swinburne - 1981 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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