Can a Turing Machine Know That the Gödel Sentence is True?

Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):525-532 (1999)
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0022362X

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10.2307/2564612

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Storrs McCall
McGill University

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On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.

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