Episteme 11 (2):181-197 (2014)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
John Hawthorne has two forceful arguments in favour of:Single-Premise Closure Necessarily, if S knows p, competently deduces q from p, and thereby comes to believe q, while retaining knowledge of p throughout, then S knows q.Each of Hawthorne's arguments rests on an intuitively appealing principle which Hawthorne calls the Equivalence Principle. I show, however, that the opponents of SPC with whom he's engaging - namely Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick - have independent reason to reject this principle, and resultantly conclude that Hawthorne's arguments in favour of SPC are not knock-down.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1017/epi.2014.5 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Edward N. Zalta (ed.) - 2004 - Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.
View all 16 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Sensitivity Hasn’T Got a Heterogeneity Problem - a Reply to Melchior.Kevin Wallbridge - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):835-841.
Similar books and articles
Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure, or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to External World Skepticism.Adam Leite - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):335-350.
Nozick's Defense of Closure.Peter Baumann - 2012 - In Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11--27.
Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):259-285.
Cornea, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement.Stephen J. Wykstra - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):87-98.
More on the Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure.Charles B. Cross - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):109-114.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2014-01-24
Total views
53 ( #212,367 of 2,499,862 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,066 of 2,499,862 )
2014-01-24
Total views
53 ( #212,367 of 2,499,862 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,066 of 2,499,862 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads