Animals show monitoring, but does monitoring imply awareness?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):349-350 (2003)
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Abstract

The very clever studies reviewed by Smith et al. convincingly demonstrate metacognitive skills in animals. However, interpreting the findings on metacognitive monitoring as showing conscious cognitive processes in animals is not warranted, because some metacognitive monitoring observed in humans appear to be automatic rather than controlled.

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