Abstract
In "Rethinking Rationality" I argue that a certain family of accounts of rationality that have historical roots in the history of philosophy and that have been recommended as ways of life, if actually adopted by people as ways of life, will make them psychologically unhealthy. I compare the sort of psychological illness they will have to the sort of illness experienced by alcoholic and other addictive persons. In effect, I suggest, the family of accounts of rationality I have in mind recommends that people become addicted to rationality. ;The sort of picture of rationality that I have in mind is what I call an "external" account of rationality. An external account of rationality is an account that asks someone to adopt another's point of view in deciding what to do. In the history of philosophy most of the relevant external accounts have asked agents to adopt a completely impersonal perspective. Moreover, these pictures ask people who adopt them as ideal ways of life to ensure that each decision they make correspond to and be approved of by the rational picture. I argue that people who thus live their lives will become unhealthy by losing contact with their personal inner lives and identities, and thus with an important part of their humanness. ;Historical representatives of the family of accounts I criticize include Socrates, Kant, and Hegel, under particular interpretations. I also criticize Nicholas Rescher as a modern representative of that same historical tradition. ;The argument for this view, after an initial introductory chapter, is presented through close examinations of Genevieve Lloyd's The Man of Reason, pop-psychologist John Bradshaw's Bradshaw On: The Family, Soren Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments and Friedrich Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols.