Moral Compromise, Civic Friendship, and Political Reconciliation

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (5):581-602 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Instrumentalism about moral compromise in politics appears inconsistent with accepting both the existence of non-instrumental or principled reasons for moral compromise in close personal friendships and a rich ideal of civic friendship. Using a robust conception of political reconciliation during democratic transitions as an example of civic friendship, I argue that all three claims are compatible. Spouses have principled reasons for compromise because they commit to sharing responsibility for their joint success as partners in life, and not because their relationship involves strong affective attitudes of goodwill, solidarity, trust, and the like. Since shared responsibility for ends is an inappropriate element in the political relationship between citizens, the members of a divided society may manifest the constitutive attitudes of political reconciliation without any commitment to principled reasons for moral compromise.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,245

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise.Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):75-96.
Is moral compromise feasible?Friderike Spang - 2024 - In Neil Hibbert, Charles Jones & Steven Lecce (eds.), Justice, Rights, and Toleration: Essays for Richard Vernon. Chicago: McGill-Queen's University Press. pp. 212–235.
On the possibility of principled moral compromise.Daniel Weinstock - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4):537-556.
What Does Morality Require When We Disagree?Martin Marchman Andersen - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (1):27-49.
Epistemic Peerhood and Moral Compromise.Simon Căbulea May - 2024 - In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. New York, NY: Routledge.
No Compromise on Racial Equality.Simon Cabulea May - 2017 - In Christian F. Rostbøll & Theresa Scavenius (eds.), Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory. New York: Routledge. pp. 34-49.
Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy.Simon Căbulea May - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (4):317-348.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-11-21

Downloads
155 (#133,864)

6 months
8 (#457,359)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Simon Căbulea May
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Why Reconciliation Requires Punishment but Not Forgiveness.Thaddeus Metz - 2022 - In Krisanna M. Scheiter & Paula Satne (eds.), Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment. Switzerland: Springer Nature. pp. 265-281.
On the possibility of principled moral compromise.Daniel Weinstock - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4):537-556.
Democratic respect and compromise.Christian F. Rostbøll - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (5):619-635.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Collected papers.John Rawls - 1999 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edited by Samuel Richard Freeman.

View all 30 references / Add more references